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THE CANADIAN SUPREME COURT'S 
ABORTION DECISION 
Like the United States, Canada has a written constitution and judicial review, 
though both the constitutional tat and the institution of judicial review differ some-
what from ours. Not surprisingly, the abortion issue. which has proved to be perhaps 
the most controversial of all constitutional issues in the United States. has also been a 
subject of constitutional dispute in Canada. Recently, the Canadian Supreme Caurt 
declared the current Canadian abortion law unconstitutional Although the opinions 
of the judges are too lengthy to reproduce in full we thought our readers in the 
United States would be interested in knowing more about the decision. 
Luckily, the decision is accompanied by some helpful introductory material e;c-
cerpting the relevant statutes and charter provisions. as well as summarizing the writ-
ten opinions. We are reprinting those materials for your edification and enjoyment 
As you will see, some of the majority Justices followed an analysis rather different 
from that of the majority in Roe v. Wade. Despite the superficial similarity in out-
comes. the Canadian case is much more than a replay of the U.S. litigation. We plan 
to offer a more e;ctensive discussion of the Canadian decision in a later issue. 
• • • • 
RELEVANT STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL 
PROVISIONS 
The Criminal Code 
251.(1) Every one who, with intent to procure the miscar-
riage of a female person, whether or not she is pregnant, uses any 
means for the purpose of carrying out nis intention is guilty of an 
indictable offence and is liable to imprisonment for life. 
(2) Every female person who, being pregnant, -with intent to 
procure her own miscarriage, uses any means or permits any means 
to be used for the purpose of carrying out her intention is guilty of 
an indictable offence and is liable to imprisonment for two years. 
(3) In this section, "means" includes 
(a) the administration of a drug or other noxious thing, 
(b) the use of an instrument, and 
(c) manipulation of any kind. 
(4) Subsections (1) and (2) do not apply to 
(a) a qualified medical practitioner, other than a mem-
ber of a therapeutic abortion committee for any hospital, who 
in good faith uses in an accredited or approved hospital any 
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means for the purpose of carrying out his intention to procure 
the miscarriage of a female person, or 
(b) a female person who, being pregnant, permits a qual-
ified medical practitioner to use in an accredited or approved 
hospital any means described in paragraph (a) for the purpose 
of carrying out her intention to procure her own miscarriage, 
if, before the use of those means, the therapeutic abortion com-
mittee for that accredited or approved hospital, by a majority 
of the members of the committee and at a meeting of the com-
mittee at which the case of such female person has been 
reviewed, 
(c) has by certificate in writing stated that in its opinion 
the continuation of the pregnancy of such female person would 
or would be likely to endanger her life or health, and 
(d) has caused a copy of such certificate to be given to 
the qualified medical practitioner. 
(5) The Minister of Health of a province may by order 
(a) require a therapeutic abortion committee for any 
hospital in that province, or any member thereof, to furnish to 
him a copy of any certificate described in paragraph 4(c) is-
sued, by that committee, together with such other information 
relating to the circumstances surrounding the issue of that cer-
tificate as he may require, or 
(b) require a medical practitioner who, in that province, 
has procured the miscarriage of any female person named in a 
certificate described in paragraph (4)(c), to furnish to him a 
copy of that certificate, together with such other information 
relating to the procuring of the miscarriage as he may require. 
(6) For the purposes of subsections (4) and (5) and this subsection 
"accredited hospital" means a hospital accredited by the 
Canadian Council on Hospital Accreditation in which di-
agnostic services and medical, surgical and obstetrical 
treatment are provided; 
"approved hospital" means a hospital in a province ap-
proved for the purposes of this section by the Minister of 
Health of that province; 
"board" means the board of governors, management or 
directors, or the trustees, commission or other person or 
group of persons having the control and management of 
an accredited or approved hospital; 
"Minister of Health" means 
(a) in the Provinces of Ontario, Quebec, New 
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Brunswick, Manitoba, Newfoundland and Prince Ed-
ward Island, the Minister of Health, 
(a.1) In the Province of Alberta, the Minister of 
Hospitals and Medical Care, 
(b) in the Province of British Columbia, the Minis-
ter of Health Services and Hospital Insurance, 
(c) in the Provinces of Nova Scotia and Saskatche-
wan, the Minister of Public Health, and 
(d) in the Yukon Territory and the Northwest Ter-
ritories, the Minister of National Health and Welfare; 
"qualified medical practitioner" means a person entitled 
to engage in the practice of medicine under the laws of the 
province in which the hospital referred to in subsection (4) 
is situated; 
"therapeutic abortion committee" for any hospital means 
a committee, comprised of not less than three members 
each of whom is a qualified medical practitioner, ap-
pointed by the board of that hospital for the purpose of 
considering and determining questions relating to termi-
nations of pregnancy within the hospital. 
(7) Nothing in subsection (4) shall be construed as making 
unnecessary the obtaining of any authorization or consent that is or 
may be required, otherwise than under this Act, before any means 
are used for the purpose of carrying out an intention to procure the 
miscarriage of a female person. 
The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 
1. The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees 
the rights and freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable 
limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free 
and democratic society. 
7. Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the 
person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance 
with the principles of fundamental justice. 
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r. v. morgentaler 
Dr. Henry Morgentaler 
Dr. Leslie Frank Smoling 
Dr. Robert Scott 
Her Majesty The Queen 
and 
• • • • • • 
Appellants 
v. 
Respondent 
The Attorney General of Canada Intervener 
indexed as: r. v. morgentaler 
File No.: 19556. 
1986: October 7, 8, 9, 10; 1988: January 28. 
Present: Dickson C.J. and Beetz, Estey, Mcintyre, Lamer, Wilson 
and La Forest JJ. 
on appeal from the court of appeal for ontario. 
Constitutional law-Charter of Rights-Life, liberty and secur-
ity of the person-Fundamental justice-Abortion-Cn'minal Code 
prohibiting abortion except where life or health of woman endan-
gered-Whether or not abortion provisions infringe right to life, lib-
erty and security of the person-If so, whether or not such 
infringement in accord with fundamental justice-Whether or not 
impugned legislation reasonable and demonstrably justified in a free 
and democratic society--Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 
ss. 1, 7-Crimina/ Code, R.S. C 1970, c. C-34, s. 251. 
Constitutional law-Jurisdiction-Superior court powers and 
inter-delegation-Whether or not therapeutic abortion committees 
exercising s. 96 court functions- Whether or not abortion provisions 
improperly delegate crimina/law powers-Constitution Act, 1867, ss. 
91(27), 96. 
Constitutional law-Charter of Rights-Whether or not Attor-
ney General's right of appeal constitutional-Costs-Whether or not 
prohibition on costs constitutional-Criminal Code, R.S.C 1970, c. 
C-34, ss. 605, s. 610(3). 
Criminal law-Abortion-Crimina/ Code prohibiting abortion 
and procuring of abortion except where lzfe or health of woman en-
dangered- Whether or not abortion provisions ultra vires Parlia-
ment-Whether or not abortion provisions infringe right to life, 
liberty and security of the person-Whether or not any infringement 
in accord with fundamental justice-Whether or not impugned legis-
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lation reasonable and demonstrably justified in a free and demo-
cratic society. 
Criminal law-Juries-Address to jury advising them to ignore 
law as stated by judge-Counsel wrong. 
Appellants, all duly qualified medical practitioners, set up a 
clinic to perform abortions upon women who had not obtained a 
certificate from a therapeutic abortion committee of an accredited 
or approved hospital as required by s. 251 ( 4) of the Criminal Code. 
The doctors had made public statements questioning the wisdom of 
the abortion laws in Canada and asserting that a woman has an 
unfettered right to choose whether or not an abortion is appropriate 
in her individual circumstances. Indictments were preferred against 
the appellants charging that they had conspired with each other 
with intent to procure abortions contrary to ss. 423( 1 )(d) and 
251 (1) of the Criminal Code. 
Counsel for the appellants moved to quash the indictment or to 
stay the proceedings before pleas were entered on the grounds that 
s. 251 of the Criminal Code was ultra vires the Parliament of Can-
ada, in that it infringed ss. 2(a), 7 and 12 of the Charter, and was 
inconsistent with s. 1(b) of the Canadian Bill of Rights. The trial 
judge dismissed the motion, and the Ontario Court of Appeal dis-
missed an appeal from that decision. The trial proceeded before a 
judge sitting with a jury, and the three accused were acquitted. The 
Crown appealed the acquittal and the appellants filed a cross-ap-
peal. The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, set aside the acquit-
tal and ordered a new trial. The Court held that the cross-appeal 
related to issues already raised in the appeal, and the issues, there-
fore, were examined as part of the appeal. Leave to appeal was 
granted by this Court. 
The Court stated the following constitutional questions: 
I. Does section 251 of the Criminal Code of Canada infringe or deny the rights 
and freedoms guaranteed by ss. 2(a), 7, 12, 15, 27 and 28 of the Canadian 
Chaner of Rights and Freedoms? 
2. If section 251 of the Criminal Code of Canada infringes or denies the rights and 
freedoms guaranteed by ss. 2(a), 7, 12, 15, 27 and 28 of the Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms, is s. 251 justified by s. I of the Canadian Chaner of 
Rights and Freedoms and therefore not inconsistent with the Constitution Act, 
1982? 
3. Is section 251 of the Criminal Code of Canada ultra vires the Parliament of 
Canada? 
4. Does section 251 of the Criminal Code of Canada violate s. 96 of the Constitu-
tion Act, 1867? 
5. Does section 251 of the Criminal Code of Canada unlawfully delegate federal 
criminal power to provincial Ministers of Health or Therapeutic Abortion 
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Committees, and in doing so, has the Federal Government abdicated its author-
ity in this area? 
6. Do sections 605 and 610(3) of the Criminal Code of Canada infringe or deny 
the rights and freedoms guaranteed by ss. 7, 11(d), 11 (/), 11(h) and 24(1) of 
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms? 
7. If sections 605 and 610(3) of the Criminal Code of Canada infringe or deny the 
rights and freedoms guaranteed by ss. 7, ll(d), 11(/), ll(h) and 24(1) of the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, are ss. 605 and 610(3) justified by s. 
1 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and therefore not inconsis-
tent with the Constitution Act, J98Z? 
Held (Mcintyre and La Forest JJ. dissenting): The appeal 
should be allowed and the acquittals restored. The first constitu-
tional question should be answered in the affirmative as regards s. 7 
only and the second in the negative as regards s. 7 only. The third, 
fourth and fifth constitutional questions should be answered in the 
negative. The sixth constitutional question should be answered in 
the negative with respect to s. 605 of the Criminal Code and should 
not be answered as regards s. 610(3). The seventh constitutional 
question should not be answered. 
Per Dickson C.J. and Lamer J.: Section 7 of the Charter re-
quires that the courts review the substance of legislation once the 
legislation has been determined to infringe an individual's right to 
"life, liberty and security of the person." Those interests may only 
be impaired if the principles of fundamental justice are respected. It 
was sufficient here to investigate whether or not the impugned legis-
lative provisions met the procedural standards of fundamental jus-
tice and the Court accordingly did not need to tread the fine line 
between substantive review and the adjudication of public policy. 
State interference with bodily integrity and serious state-im-
posed psychological stress, at least in the criminal law context, con-
stitutes a breach of security of the person. Section 251 clearly 
interferes with a woman's physical and bodily integrity. Forcing a 
woman, by threat of criminal sanction, to carry a foetus to term 
unless she meets certain criteria unrelated to her own priorities and 
aspirations, is a profound interference with a woman's body and 
thus an infringement of security of the person. A second breach of 
the right to security of the person occurs independently as a result 
of the delay in obtaining therapeutic abortions caused by the 
mandatory procedures of s. 251 which results in a higher 
probability of complications and greater risk. The harm to the psy-
chological integrity of women seeking abortions was also clearly 
established. 
Any infringement of the right to life, liberty and security of the 
person must comport with the principles of fundamental justice. 
These principles are to be found in the basic tenets of our legal sys-
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tern. One of the basic tenets of our system of criminal justice is that 
when Parliament creates a defence to a criminal charge, the defence 
should not be illusory or so difficult to attain as to be practically 
illusory. 
The procedure and restrictions stipulated in s. 251 for access to 
therapeutic abortions make the defence illusory resulting in a failure 
to comply with the principles of fundamental justice. A therapeutic 
abortion may be approved by a "therapeutic abortion committee" 
of an "accredited or approved hospital". The requirement of s. 
251(4) that at least four physicians be available at that hospital to 
authorize and to perform an abortion in practice makes abortions 
unavailable in many hospitals. The restriction attaching to the term 
"accredited" automatically disqualifies many Canadian hospitals 
from undertaking therapeutic abortions. The provincial approval of 
a hospital for the purpose of performing therapeutic abortions fur-
ther restricts the number of hospitals offering this procedure. Even 
if a hospital is eligible to create a therapeutic abortion committee, 
there is no requirement in s. 251 that the hospital need do so. Pro-
vincial regulation as well can heavily restrict or even deny the prac-
tical availability of the exculpatory provisions of s. 251(4). 
The administrative system established ins. 251(4) fails to pro-
vide an adequate standard for therapeutic abortion committees 
which must determine when a therapeutic abortion should, as a 
matter of law, be granted. The word "health" is vague and no ade-
quate guidelines have been established for therapeutic abortion 
committees. It is typically impossible for women to know in ad-
vance what standard of health will be applied by any given 
committee. 
The argument that women facing difficulties in obtaining abor-
tions at home can simply travel elsewhere would not be especially 
troubling if those difficulties were not in large measure created by 
the procedural requirements of s. 251. The evidence established 
convincingly that it is the law itself which in many ways prevents 
access to local therapeutic abortion facilities. 
Section 251 cannot be saved under s. 1 of the Charter. The 
objective of s. 251 as a whole, namely to balance the competing 
interests identified by Parliament, is sufficiently important to pass 
the first stage of the s. I inquiry. The means chosen to advance its 
legislative objectives, however, are not reasonable or demonstrably 
justified in a free and democratic society. None of the three ele-
ments for assessing the proportionality of means to ends is met. 
Firstly, the procedures and administrative structures created by s. 
251 are often unfair and arbitrary. Moreover, these procedures im-
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pair s. 7 rights far more than is necessary because they hold out an 
illusory defence to many women who would prima facie qualify 
under the exculpatory provisions ofs. 251(4). Finally, the effects of 
the limitation upon the s. 7 rights of many pregnant women are out 
of proportion to the objective sought to be achieved and may actu-
ally defeat the objective of protecting the life and health of women. 
Per Beetz and Estey JJ.: Before the advent of the Charter, Par-
liament recognized, in adopting s. 251(4) ofthe Criminal Code, that 
the interest in the life or health of the pregnant woman takes prece-
dence over the interest in prohibiting abortions, including the inter-
est of the state in the protection of the foetus, when "the 
continuation of the pregnancy of such female person would or 
would be likely to endanger her life or health". This standard ins. 
251(4) became entrenched at least as a minimum when the "right to 
life, liberty and security of the person" was enshrined in the Cana-
dian Charter of Rights and Freedoms at s. 7. 
"Security of the person" within the meaning of s. 7 of the 
Charter must include a right of access to medical treatment for a 
condition representing a danger to life or health without fear of 
criminal sanction. If an act of Parliament forces a pregnant woman 
whose life or health is in danger to choose between, on the one 
hand, the commission of a crime to obtain effective and timely med-
ical treatment and, on the other hand, inadequate treatment or no 
treatment at all, her right to security of the person has been 
violated. 
According to the evidence, the procedural requirements of s. 
251 of the Criminal Code significantly delay pregnant women's ac-
cess to medical treatment resulting in an additional danger to their 
health, thereby depriving them of their right to security of the per-
son. This deprivation does not accord with the principles of funda-
mental justice. While Parliament is justified in requiring a reliable, 
independent and medically sound opinion as to the "life or health" 
of the pregnant woman in order to protect the state interest in the 
foetus, and while any such statutory mechanism will inevitably re-
sult in some delay, certain of the procedural requirements of s. 251 
of the Criminal Code are nevertheless manifestly unfair. These re-
quirements are manifestly unfair in that they are unnecessary in re-
spect to Parliament's objectives in establishing the administrative 
structure and in that they result i11 additional risks to the health of 
pregnant women. 
The following statutory requirements contribute to the mani-
fest unfairness of the administrative structure imposed by the Crim-
inal Code: (1) the requirement that all therapeutic abortions must 
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take place in an "accredited" or "approved" hospital as defined in s. 
251(6); (2) the requirement that the committee come from the ac-
credited or approved hospital in which the abortion is to be per-
formed; (3) the provision that allows hospital boards to increase the 
number of members of a committee; (4) the requirement that all 
physicians who practise lawful therapeutic abortions be excluded 
from the committees. 
The primary objective of s. 251 of the Criminal Code is the 
protection of the foetus. The protection of the life and health of the 
pregnant woman is an ancillary objective. The primary objective 
does relate to concerns which are pressing and substantial in a free 
and democratic society and which, pursuant to s. 1 of the Charter, 
justify reasonable limits to be put on a woman's right. However, 
the means chosen in s. 251 are not reasonable and demonstrably 
justified. The rules unnecessary in respect of the primary and ancil-
lary objectives which they are designed to serve, such as the above-
mentioned rules contained ins. 251, cannot be said to be rationally 
connected to these objectives under s. 1 of the Charter. Conse-
quently, s. 251 does not constitute a reasonable limit to the security 
of the person. 
It is not necessary to answer the question concerning the cir-
cumstances in which there is a proportionality between the effects of 
s. 251 which limit the right of pregnant women to security of the 
person and the objective of the protection of the foetus. In any 
event, the objective of protecting the foetus would not justify the 
severity of the breach of pregnant women's right to security of the 
person which would result if the exculpatory provision of s. 251 was 
completely removed from the Criminal Code. However, it is possi-
ble that a future enactment by Parliament that would require a 
higher degree of danger to health in the latter months of pregnancy, 
as opposed to the early months, for an abortion to be lawful, could 
achieve a proportionality which would be acceptable under s. 1 of 
the Charter. 
Given the conclusion that s. 251 contains rules unnecessary to 
the protection of the foetus, the question as to whether a foetus is 
included in the word "everyone" in s. 7, so as to have a right to 
"life, liberty and security of the person" under the Charter, need not 
be decided. 
Section 251 is not colourable provincial legislation in relation 
to health but rather a proper exercise of Parliament's criminal law 
power pursuant to s. 91 (27) of the Constitution Act, 1867. The sec-
tion does not offend s. 96 of the Constitution Act, 1867 because the 
therapeutic abortion committees are not given judicial powers 
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which were exercised by county, district and superior courts at the 
time of Confederation. These committees exercise a medical judg-
ment on a medical question. Finally, s. 251 does not constitute an 
unlawful delegation of federal legislative power nor does it represent 
an abdication of the criminal law power by Parliament. 
There is no merit in the argument based on s. 605(1)(a) of the 
Criminal Code. It is unnecessary to decide whether or not s. 610(3) 
of the Criminal Code violates ss. 7, ll(d), 11 (f), 11(h) and 15 of the 
Charter or whether this Court has the power to award costs on ap-
peals under s. 24(1) of the Charter. Whatever this Court's power to 
award costs in appeals such as this one, costs should not be awarded 
in this case. 
Per Wilson J.: Section 251 of the Criminal Code, which limits 
the pregnant woman's access to abortion, violates her right to life, 
liberty and security of the person within the meaning of s. 7 of the 
Charter in a way which does not accord with the principles of fun-
damental justice. 
The right to "liberty" contained in s. 7 guarantees to every in-
dividual a degree of personal autonomy over important decisions 
intimately affecting his or her private life. Liberty in a free and 
democratic society does not require the state to approve such deci-
sions but it does require the state to respect them. 
A woman's decision to terminate her pregnancy falls within 
this class of protected decisions. It is one that will have profound 
psychological, economic and social consequences for her. It is a 
decision that deeply reflects the way the woman thinks about herself 
and her relationship to others and to society at large. It is not just a 
medical decision; it is a profound social and ethical one as well. 
Section 251 of the Criminal Code takes a personal and private 
decision away from the woman and gives it to a committee which 
bases its decision on "criteria entirely unrelated to [the pregnant 
woman's] priorities and aspirations." 
Section 251 also deprives a pregnant woman of her right to 
security of the person under s. 7 of the Charter. This right protects 
both the physical and psychological integrity of the individual. Sec-
tion 251 is more deeply flawed than just subjecting women to con-
siderable emotional stress and unnecessary physical risk. It asserts 
that the woman's capacity to reproduce is to be subject, not to her 
own control, but to that of the state. This is a direct interference 
with the woman's physical "person". 
This violation of s. 7 does not accord with either procedural 
fairness or with the fundamental rights and freedoms laid down 
elsewhere in the Charter. A deprivation of the s. 7 right which has 
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the effect of infringing a right guaranteed elsewhere in the Charter 
cannot be in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice. 
The deprivation of the s. 7 right in this case offends freedom of 
conscience guaranteed in s. 2(a) of the Charter. The decision 
whether or not to terminate a pregnancy is essentially a moral deci-
sion and in a free and democratic society the conscience of the indi-
vidual must be paramount to that of the state. Indeed, s. 2(a) 
makes it clear that this freedom belongs to each of us individually. 
"Freedom of conscience and religion" should be broadly construed 
to extend to conscientiously-held beliefs, whether grounded in reli-
gion or in a secular morality and the terms "conscience" and "reli-
gion" should not be treated as tautologous if capable of 
independent, although related, meaning. The state here is endors-
ing one conscientiously-held view at the expense of another. It is 
denying freedom of conscience to some, treating them as means to 
an end, depriving them of their "essential humanity." 
The primary objective of the impugned legislation is the pro-
tection of the foetus. This is a perfectly valid legislative objective. 
It has other ancillary objectives, such as the protection of the life 
and health of the pregnant woman and the maintenance of proper 
medical standards. 
The situation respecting a woman's right to control her own 
person becomes more complex when she becomes pregnant, and 
some statutory control may be appropriate. Section 1 of the Char-
ter authorizes reasonable limits to be put upon the woman's right 
having regard to the fact of the developing foetus within her body. 
The value to be placed on the foetus as potential life is directly 
related to the stage of its development during gestation. The unde-
veloped foetus starts out as a newly fertilized ovum; the fully devel-
oped foetus emerges ultimately as an infant. A developmental 
progression takes place in between these two extremes and it has a 
direct bearing on the value of the foetus as potential life. Accord-
ingly, the foetus should be viewed in differential and developmental 
terms. This view of the foetus supports a permissive approach to 
abortion in the early stages where the woman's autonomy would be 
absolute and a restrictive approach in the later stages where the 
state's interest in protecting the foetus would justify its prescribing 
conditions. The precise point in the development of the foetus at 
which the state's interest in its protection becomes "compelling" 
should be left to the informed judgment of the legislature which is 
in a position to receive submissions on the subject from all the rele-
vant disciplines. 
Section 251 of the Criminal Code cannot be saved under s. I of 
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the Charter. It takes the decision away from the woman at all 
stages of her pregnancy and completely denies, as opposed to limits, 
her right under s. 7. Section 251 cannot meet the proportionality 
test; it is not sufficiently tailored to the objective; it does not impair 
the woman's right "as little as possible." Accordingly, even ifs. 251 
were to be amended to remedy the procedural defects in the legisla-
tive scheme, it would still not be constitutionally valid. 
The question whether a foetus is covered by the word "every-
one" in s. 7 so as to have an independent right to life under that 
section was not dealt with. 
Per Mcintyre and La Forest JJ. (dissenting): Save for the pro-
visions of the Criminal Code permitting abortion where the life or 
health of the woman is at risk, no right of abortion can be found in 
Canadian law, custom or tradition and the Charter, including s. 7, 
does not create such a right. Section 251 of the Criminal Code ac-
cordingly does not violate s. 7 of the Charter. 
The power of judicial review of legislation, although given 
greater scope under the Charter, is not unlimited. The courts must 
confine themselves to such democratic values as are clearly ex-
pressed in the Charter and refrain from imposing or creating rights 
with no identifiable base in the Charter. The Court is not entitled to 
define a right in a manner unrelated to the interest that the right in 
question was meant to protect. 
The infringement of a right such as the right to security of the 
person will occur only when legislation goes beyond interfering with 
priorities and aspirations and abridges rights included in or pro-
tected by the concept. The proposition that women enjoy a consti-
tutional right to have an abortion is devoid of support in either the 
language, structure or history of the constitutional text, in constitu-
tional tradition, or in the history, traditions or underlying philoso-
phies of our society. 
Historically, there has always been a clear recognition of a 
public interest in the protection of the unborn and there is no evi-
dence or indication of general acceptance of the concept of abortion 
at will in our society. The interpretive approach to the Charter 
adopted by this Court affords no support for the entrenchment of a 
constitutional right of abortion. 
As to the asserted right to be free from state interference with 
bodily integrity and serious state-imposed psychological stress, an 
invasion of the s. 7 right of security of the person, there would have 
to be more than state-imposed stress or strain. A breach of the 
right would have to be based upon an infringement of some interest 
which would be of such nature and such importance as to warrant 
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constitutional protection. This would be limited to cases where the 
state-action complained of, in addition to imposing stress and 
strain, also infringed another right, freedom or interest which was 
deserving of protection under the concept of security of the person. 
Abortion is not such an interest. Even if a general right to have an 
abortion could be found under s. 7, the extent to which such right 
could be said to be infringed by the requirements of s. 251 of the 
Code was not clearly shown. 
A defence created by Parliament could only be said to be illu-
sory or practically so when the defence is not available in the cir-
cumstances in which it is held out as being available. The very 
nature of the test assumes that Parliament is to define the defence 
and, in so doing, designate the terms upon which it may be avail-
able. The allegation of procedural unfairness is not supported by 
the claim that many women wanting abortions have been unable to 
get them in Canada because the failure of s. 251(4) to respond to 
this need. This machinery was considered adequate to deal with the 
type of abortion Parliament had envisaged. Any inefficiency in the 
administrative scheme is caused principally by forces external to the 
statute-the general demand for abortion irrespective of the provi-
sions of s. 251. A court cannot strike down a statutory provision on 
this basis. 
Section 605(1)(a), which gives the Crown a right of appeal 
against an acquittal in a trial court on any ground involving a ques-
tion of law alone, does not offend ss. 11 (d), 11 {f) and 11 (h) of the 
Charter. The words of s. 11 (h), "if finally acquitted" and "if finally 
found guilty," must be construed to mean after the appellate proce-
dures have been completed, otherwise there would be no point or 
meaning in the word "finally." 
Section 251 did not infringe the equality rights of women, 
abridge freedom of religion, or inflict cruel or unusual punishment. 
The section was not in pith and substance legislation for the protec-
tion of health and therefore within provincial competence but 
rather was validly enacted under the federal criminal law power. 
There was no merit to the arguments that s. 251 purported to give 
powers to therapeutic abortion committees exercised by county, dis-
trict, and superior courts at the time of Confederation or that it 
delegated powers relating to criminal law to the provinces generally. 
No evidence supported the defence of necessity. 
